Fix Guides
Salesforce “Prepare for Certificate Changes”: What Changes, Who Is Affected, What to Do
Updated 2026-11-10
What changed: per Salesforce KB 005237282, a single certificate can no longer be valid for both server and client authentication once Chrome Root Program v1.8 is enforced after March 15, 2027. Separately, public TLS certificates are getting shorter lives through 2029, and Salesforce may change the root CA its own certificates chain to. Who is affected: orgs and integrations that use mutual TLS with a public CA certificate, own CA-signed certificates, pin certificates or trust a single root.
Key dates
- Feb 5, 2026: Salesforce's own certificates began moving to a chain that ends at DigiCert Global Root G2. A system that trusts only one older root, or pins a certificate, fails the handshake after a change like this. (Salesforce KB 005252999)
- Mar 15, 2026: Maximum lifespan of a publicly trusted TLS certificate: 200 days (from 398). (CA/Browser Forum SC-081v3; Salesforce release note)
- Mar 15, 2027: Chrome Root Program v1.8 enforced: subscriber certificates must assert server authentication only, so one public certificate can no longer serve as both server and client (mutual TLS) certificate. Public lifespan limit drops to 100 days. (Salesforce KB 005237282; Chrome Root Program policy)
- Mar 15, 2029: Maximum lifespan of a publicly trusted TLS certificate: 47 days. (CA/Browser Forum SC-081v3; Salesforce “Certificates in Salesforce”)
Symptoms
- 1. You received the email and do not know if it applies to you. It applies if a system logs in to Salesforce with a client certificate (mutual TLS), if you own CA-signed certificates in Certificate and Key Management, or if a system that calls Salesforce pins a certificate or holds a narrow truststore.
- 2. An integration authenticates to Salesforce with a certificate that is also its website certificate. That is a dual-use certificate. Per Salesforce's KB article, a single certificate can no longer be valid for both server and client authentication once the Chrome policy is enforced.
- 3. A certificate renewal is due and your CA offers shorter terms. Public TLS certificates are capped at 200 days now, and the cap falls to 100 days on Mar 15, 2027. Renewal calendars built around a yearly cycle will miss.
- 4. Callouts or inbound connections fail with an SSL handshake or certificate error. An expired or replaced certificate, or a truststore that lacks the issuing root, produces this. Check the certificate dates and the truststore before anything else.
What to Check
- 1. List who logs in with mutual TLS. Find the users and API clients that use a Mutual Authentication Certificate for API login. Those are the integrations the dual-use change reaches.
- 2. Find out where each client certificate comes from. Is the certificate issued by a public CA that chains to the same root as the server certificate? If so it is dual-use. Salesforce's KB says private or enterprise CAs are not affected by the Chrome policy, but also that Salesforce does not currently support private PKI for inbound mutual TLS, so check which CA is in play.
- 3. Open Certificate and Key Management. In Setup, list every certificate with its expiry date and whether it is CA-signed. Note which are self-signed: per Salesforce, self-signed certificates are not subject to the new lifespans.
- 4. Inventory certificates used by credentials. Check Named Credentials with a client certificate, External Credentials with a signing certificate and connected apps using the JWT bearer flow. Each depends on a certificate that expires.
- 5. Check what trusts Salesforce. For systems that call Salesforce, confirm they trust the full Mozilla root list, not one named root, and do not pin a Salesforce certificate. Salesforce's customer email says it may switch or add root CA providers. Old Java is the usual gap: Salesforce's MuleSoft article says Java 8 before update 75 lacks DigiCert Global Root G2.
- 6. Check what Salesforce trusts. For systems that Salesforce calls or that log in with a certificate, open /cacerts.jsp on your org's hostname. It lists the root CAs Salesforce trusts, and per the KB the same list is used for inbound mutual TLS.
How to Fix It
- 1. Get a separate client certificate for each mutual TLS client. Use a public CA for the server identity and a different CA for the client identity. Per Salesforce's KB, the client certificate must contain the client authentication EKU and the issuing CA must be trusted by Salesforce. The KB names six roots whose CAs will still issue public client certificates: DigiCert Assured ID Root G2 and G3, SSL.com Client ECC and RSA Root CA 2022, and Sectigo Public Email Protection Root R46 and E46. GlobalSign Client Authentication Root E45 and R45 are not named in the KB but were on Salesforce's trusted root list at login.salesforce.com/cacerts.jsp when we read it on Nov 10, 2026. Confirm your chosen root is on your own org's list before you buy.
- 2. Upload it and switch before March 15, 2027. Upload the new certificate as the Mutual Authentication Certificate, move the client over, and confirm a login in Login History before the old certificate is retired. Do this well ahead of your CA's own cutoff; the CAs' dates are earlier (see the FAQ).
- 3. Move renewals to a shorter, calendared cycle. For certificates you own, plan to rotate more often and give the receiving system the new public certificate before you switch. Salesforce's release note asks you to assign the Expired Certificate Notification permission to specific admins and to use the Certificate metadata API type. Those notifications cover certificates stored in your org, not Salesforce's own TLS certificates.
- 4. Trust the root list, drop pinning. Create a truststore from the Mozilla Server Authentication root list on any system that calls Salesforce, and remove certificate pinning. Salesforce guarantees only that its certificates chain to a root on that list, not to any one root. It says it typically rotates its certificates at least 45 days before they expire, that pinning is not supported on Hyperforce or for Marketing Cloud Engagement, and that it planned to stop announcing certificate rotations for first-party data center production orgs on July 6, 2026.
- 5. Record the owner and the dates. Write down each certificate, what depends on it, the expiry and who renews it. Put Mar 15, 2027 on the calendar.
Check your org's certificate posture free: the free health check is a short questionnaire that gives a peer-benchmarked score, with no account and no org connection. Connected orgs get the CERT_001 to CERT_004 certificate checks.
Sources: Salesforce Help 005237282, 000385468, Certificates in Salesforce, Prepare for Shorter Certificate Lifespans, Mutual Authentication Certificate setup and 005252999 (MuleSoft); the Chrome Root Program policy and CA/Browser Forum SC-081v3. All were re-read on Nov 10, 2026. Dates can move, so confirm them in the live articles.
FAQ
When do Salesforce's dual-use certificate changes take effect?
Per Salesforce KB 005237282, the Chrome Root Program v1.8 changes are enforced after March 15, 2027. The date moved from June 15, 2026. The Chrome policy applies the rule to certificates issued on or after that date, and DigiCert says existing certificates that carry client authentication stay trusted until they expire. The Salesforce setup page for mutual authentication certificates still cited Chrome policy v1.7 and June 15, 2026 when we read it on Nov 10, 2026, so rely on the KB article and the Chrome policy, which agree on March 15, 2027.
The email reads as urgent. Is the real deadline sooner than March 2027?
For buying or renewing, yes. The CAs stop issuing dual-use certificates before Chrome's date (see the next question), and a renewal that falls after your CA's cutoff comes back without client authentication. Check when each mutual TLS client certificate expires; that expiry, or your CA's cutoff, is your working deadline.
Are private CA client certificates affected?
Per the KB, private or enterprise CAs are not affected by the Chrome policy. The same KB says Salesforce does not currently support private PKI for inbound mutual TLS, so a client certificate must come from a CA Salesforce trusts.
When do public CAs stop issuing dual-use certificates?
Earlier than Salesforce's date. DigiCert turned client authentication off by default on Oct 1, 2025 and removes it entirely on Mar 1, 2027; Sectigo turned it off by default on Oct 7, 2025 and removes it entirely on Feb 10, 2027. These dates are from the CAs' own pages as read on Nov 10, 2026; confirm them with your CA.
Can Salesforce change the root CA its own certificates chain to?
Yes. Salesforce's customer email says it may switch or add root CA providers, and its help page guarantees only a chain to a root on Mozilla's Server Authentication root list. It has happened already: per Salesforce KB 005252999, Salesforce certificates began chaining to DigiCert Global Root G2 on Feb 5, 2026. Systems that trust the whole Mozilla list are unaffected; systems that trust one root or pin a certificate break.
We run MuleSoft. Is there anything extra to do?
Salesforce has a separate article for MuleSoft, KB 005252999. It says CloudHub 1.0 and 2.0 apps on a supported runtime need no action unless they use a custom truststore, which must contain DigiCert Global Root G2. For on-premise, Runtime Fabric and hybrid runtimes it depends on the Java version: Java 8 update 75 or newer and Java 17 include that root. The article gives a keytool command that searches the cacerts file for digicertglobalrootg2.
How short will public certificate lifespans get?
200 days from Mar 15, 2026, 100 days from Mar 15, 2027 and 47 days from Mar 15, 2029, per CA/Browser Forum ballot SC-081v3 as reflected on Salesforce's help pages. Self-signed certificates are not subject to it.
Does Wrenk check any of this?
Yes. Wrenk's health check includes certificate checks CERT_001 to CERT_004: certificate expiry, CA-signed certificates with long validity, users who must log in with a client certificate, and Named Credential certificates nearing expiry. A check that cannot read the data is reported as not assessed, never as a pass. Wrenk cannot see the client's own certificate, so it cannot tell you whether it is dual-use.
Is anything here unconfirmed?
Yes. We found no Salesforce-published date on which Salesforce itself stops presenting dual-use certificates, so none is stated. Salesforce's email says it may switch or add root CA providers but names no provider or date, so none is stated either. Every Salesforce article cited here was re-read in a browser on Nov 10, 2026.
Wrenk runs this kind of audit and the fixes that follow across every connected org as part of managed Salesforce operations.